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I. INTRODUCTION
The choice of how much of society’s income to consume today and how much to
save for future consumption is among the most important economic decisions. It
can have implications not only for the well-being of the households taking the
decisions, but also for the rate at which the economy invests and grows, and
therefore the well-being of future generations. The way in which savings
decisions are taken is a matter of ongoing research in the literature, involving
such important and unresolved issues as the degree of foresight and rationality of
households, the extent to which capital markets are complete and well-
functioning, the importance of life-cycle versus bequest versus precautionary
motives for saving, and more generally the weight, if any, that current savers put
on the welfare of future generations.
Taxation is one of many policies that affect the level of savings. Other
significant ones include the system of social insurance, especially pensions, but
also health and disability insurance, welfare services and education; transfers of
various sorts; and debt policy. None the less, the principles by which saving
behaviour responds to these various policies are very similar. We begin our
survey with a discussion of these principles, first at the household level and then
in the aggregate. Then, the effects of taxation are addressed. This is done first
from a theoretical perspective, followed by a discussion of some of the main
currents in the empirical literature on taxation and savings. Finally, we address
some important normative or policy issues that have arisen in the literature,
focusing mainly on two issues. One is the optimal tax treatment of savings —
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should capital income be taxed? If so, how? The second is the more general issue
of what the optimal rate of saving in the economy is.
II. THE DETERMINANTS OF SAVING
There are several aspects of saving that differentiate it from other consumer
optimisation decisions and that turn out to be important for tax analysis. For one
thing, the ultimate object of choice is future consumption, of which savings is
the value rather than the quantity. The price of future consumption in terms of
current consumption is the after-tax discount factor. Thus, saving is the
discounted present value of future consumption. Even though a fall in the price
of future consumption (a rise in the after-tax interest rate) may cause a rise in
future consumption, it may involve a fall in the level of savings since a given
amount of future consumption can be obtained at a lower cost in terms of
forgone current consumption.
A second distinguishing feature of saving concerns the nature of the budget
constraint. An individual’s income may take the form of a stream of earnings (or
other forms of non-capital income) in both present and future periods, so that the
budget constraint involves a present value of earnings, referred to as lifetime
wealth. This has two implications. First, a given stream of consumption over
time will involve different levels of savings depending upon the time profile of
the earnings stream. The later that earnings occur, the less savings (or more
dissavings) will be required to finance a given amount of consumption. Second,
a change in the price of future consumption (the after-tax discount rate) will
cause a change in the present value of earnings or lifetime wealth. This change
will be larger the more is the earnings stream skewed towards the future because
the discount factor will be higher for earnings further in the future. This induced
change in lifetime wealth caused by a change in the price of future consumption
will give rise to an indirect effect on household saving behaviour, referred to as
the human wealth effect, that s not present in standard consumer choice models
(Summers, 1981).
The intertemporal nature of the saving decision gives rise to various other
unique issues. For one thing, there will be uncertainty about the future, and
varying amounts of it may be borne by the individual saver. For another, to the
extent that the individual is a dissaver in certain periods, there may be liquidity
constraints which will restrict the individual’s choice. Also, there will be a
variety of instruments for converting present into future consumption, including
financial assets (debt, shares in firms, annuities, pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance policies), real property, unincorporated business assets, consumer
durables (including housing) and even investment in human capital formation.
These distinctions are relevant because different savings instruments are
typically treated differently for tax purposes.Taxation and Savings
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Finally, saving is often seen as a vehicle for achieving altruistic objectives,
particularly altruism within the family. The existence of altruism turns out to
have a profound effect on the way in which taxation affects savings, as well as
on the way in which we conduct our economic analysis of saving. Saving to
account for altruistic motives gives rise to bequests and gifts to younger cohorts.
1. Individual Savings
The simplest case to consider is that of a selfish individual whose economic life
can be divided into two periods, who receives earnings Y in the first period only,
faces perfect capital markets with full certainty and whose only decision is how
to divide the earnings into first-period consumption, C1, and second-period
consumption, C2, so as to maximise a lifetime utility function in C1 and C2. The
budget constraint facing the household states that the present value of
consumption, discounted at the after-tax interest rate, equals earnings. The
combination of present and future consumption chosen will be such that the
marginal rate of substitution between the two is just the relative price of future
consumption, p = 1/(1+r(1 – t)), where r is the interest rate and t is the tax on
interest income.
The amount of saving, S (i.e. Y – C1), will depend upon the earnings of the
household and the relative price, p. An increase in Y will typically increase S,
since the household will want to increase both present and future consumption
(assuming them both to be normal goods). However, an increase in p (reduction
in r(1 – t)) will have offsetting effects on savings. The higher price will tend to
make the consumer substitute present consumption for the more expensive future
consumption (the substitution effect), thus reducing savings. At the same time,
the higher price of future consumption makes the consumer worse off since less
of both goods can be bought with a given amount of income. This reduction in
real income tends to cause the household to reduce both present and future
consumption and so to save less (the income effect). Although future
consumption will definitely fall, whether saving rises or falls with a fall in the
interest rate depends upon the relative strengths of the income and substitution
effects. Broadly speaking, the more the consumer is willing to substitute present
for future consumption (the less the curvature in the household’s indifference
curves between C1 and C2), the greater will be the substitution effect relative to
the income effect, and the larger positive (smaller negative) will be the
responsiveness of saving to increases in the after-tax interest rate. The issue
becomes an empirical one.
The above discussion assumes that all earnings are in the first period. If there
are second-period earnings, there will be additional effects. The household
problem now involves maximising lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint
which says that the present value of consumption must equal the present value of
earnings, or lifetime wealth. An increase in earnings in either period willFiscal Studies
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increase lifetime wealth, and thus will increase both present and future
consumption if both are normal goods. However, the effect on savings will
depend upon the period in which the earnings increase. Increases in first-period
earnings will increase savings as above. However, increases in second-period
earnings will reduce savings since the individual will need to borrow against the
future earnings increase in order to increase first-period consumption. This life-
cycle timing effect is of crucial importance to the analysis of the effect of
taxation on savings.
An increase in p (reduction in r(1 – t)) will have the usual income and
substitution effects as above, but there will now be an additional effect, the
human wealth effect. The increase in p will increase the present value of future
earnings, thereby causing lifetime wealth to rise. This will increase the demand
for C1, thus reducing S unambiguously. In other words, the human wealth effect
will unambiguously increase the interest elasticity of saving. For a given initial
value of lifetime wealth, the interest elasticity of saving will be higher the higher
is the proportion of earnings accruing in the second period.
Human Capital Investment
There are various extensions that could be added to this two-period model of
savings. The first involves human capital investment, which effectively makes
the earnings stream endogenous.
2 Suppose individuals can convert forgone
present earnings into increased future earnings by devoting some of their time to
education or training rather than working. The stream of earnings will then be
chosen as that at which the marginal rate of return to human capital formation
(the increment in future earnings from a marginal reduction in current earnings)
just equals the after-tax discount factor defined as above. A reduction in r(1 – t)
increases investment in human capital, causing current income to fall and future
income to rise. This causes saving to fall, thereby reinforcing the human wealth
effect in increasing the interest elasticity of saving. In effect, the individual has
substituted human wealth for asset wealth (Davies and St.-Hilaire, 1987).
Bequests
Another important extension to the two-period model is to allow for bequests.
There are three main reasons for bequests: uncertain lifetimes, altruism, and
strategic behaviour with respect to children.
Uncertain lifetimes. Uncertain lifetimes will result in involuntary bequests if
the individual has to self-insure against the possibility of living a long life. In the
two-period model, individuals may or may not live to the second period, but
precautionary wealth must be held to finance consumption in case they do. If
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they die early, the wealth is passed on to the next generation. This motive for
saving would disappear if there were well-functioning annuity markets in which
the individuals could insure themselves; individuals would behave as if their
lifetimes were known with certainty and the above analysis of the effects of
earnings and after-tax interest rate changes would apply. An additional
possibility might now be forms of income received in the second period which
are contingent on being alive, such as public pensions. Since these are like
annuities, they reduce the need for precautionary saving (Abel, 1985).
Altruism. Altruism towards one’s heirs implies that households take
decisions not only with their own lifetime utility in mind, but also with the well-
being of their heirs. They will allocate their lifetime earnings between their own
consumption and that of their heirs such that at the margin they are indifferent
between the last pounds of own and heirs’ consumption. An increase in income
will partly go to consumption for one’s heirs as well as one’s own consumption.
Thus, there will be an additional factor tending towards an increase in saving out
of income increases. An interesting case is that in which all households care for
the level of utility attained by their immediate heirs. In this case, indirectly they
care for their heirs’ heirs (since this affects the utility of their heirs), and for their
heirs’ heirs’ heirs, and so on into the indefinite future. In taking decisions about
how much to leave to their immediate heirs, they behave as if their own utility
function included the consumption of all future heirs. This is referred to as a
dynastic utility function, or a utility function with an infinite time horizon. The
intertemporal allocation of consumption across various members of the dynasty
can be determined by maximising the dynastic utility function subject to the
present value of wealth available to the entire dynasty into the infinite future. To
the extent that this is the case, it has an important policy implication. Consider
an increase in an individual’s income which is offset by a reduction in the
income of their heir (or their heir’s heir etc.) such that dynastic wealth is
unchanged. In this case, the pattern of consumption across members of the
dynasty will remain unchanged. The income transfer will be exactly offset by
changes in bequests in the opposite direction. This idea that intergenerational
transfers imposed on households by, say, the government will be completely
undone by changes in bequests is known in the literature as the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem (Barro, 1974).
3
Strategic bequests. Finally, bequests may be ‘strategic’ in nature, given by
selfish parents conditional on their children performing certain duties or
services, such as staying in the family business, caring for parents in old age etc.
(Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). The greater the promised bequest, the
more services might the children be expected to perform. Strategic bequest
models focus attention on the effect of tax and other policies on the bargaining
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strength of parents and children within the family; whereas altruistic parents
would simply pass incremental social security benefits on to their children as
bequests, strategically- motivated parents would use the prospect of higher
benefits to elicit additional assistance or other transfers from their children. The
strategic-bequest model may also have important implications for the effect of
estate taxation on savings. Estate taxes effectively increase the price of child
services relative to current consumption, reducing the demand for these services
and hence the level of parental saving.
The Multi-Period Case
The results of the two-period model apply in the multi-period case, along with
some additional results. Consider the selfish consumer who obtains an
exogenous stream of earnings over a given (working) portion of the life cycle
and converts it to a stream of consumption. The basic results can be illustrated
supposing that lifetime utility is just the sum of utilities of consumption achieved
in each period, discounted at the rate !. In this case, the marginal utility of
consumption falls at the proportional rate r(1 – t) – !, which is generally taken to
be positive. If the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is constant and
denoted ", consumption rises at the proportional rate (r(1– t)– !)/". All saving is
for life-cycle smoothing purposes. The savings profile is hump-shaped, rising in
the early part of the life cycle, then falling, and eventually becoming negative as
wealth is run down in retirement. Saving may also be negative at the beginning
of the life cycle. Define lifetime wealth in any period as the sum of asset wealth
and human wealth (the present value of future earnings). Consumption in each
period can be shown to be proportionate to lifetime wealth in that period, where
the propensity to consume rises with age, but can rise or fall with the after-tax
interest rate (Beach, Boadway and Bruce, 1988). Since the present value of
future earnings falls with a rise in the interest rate, the human wealth effect from
a rise in the interest rate causes a decrease in current consumption.
Suppose income increases unexpectedly in some period. Lifetime wealth then
rises, as does the lifetime consumption profile. Saving will increase in the short
run as well as in some following periods, and the asset accumulation profile will
shift upwards.
4 If income rises in one period and falls in another, there will be a
change in saving even if the lifetime consumption profile is unchanged. For
example, an increase in income in some future period accompanied by a decline
in income now which leaves the present value of lifetime income unchanged (as
would occur with a funded public pension scheme) will cause no change in
lifetime consumption. However, saving will fall this period to finance the same
stream of consumption out of a smaller amount of income. Or, a transfer of
income from a young person to an old person will cause a rise in total
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consumption because the propensity to consume out of wealth is higher for the
old than for the young.
Changes in the interest rate have a somewhat more complicated effect on the
consumption and asset accumulation profile. An increase in the interest rate will
cause the consumption profile to become steeper so that over the life cycle more
assets would have to be accumulated to finance future consumption. However, in
the short run, savings could rise or fall since the propensity to consume out of
current wealth could increase or decrease with the interest rate. Note that the
effect of an interest rate change on saving is likely to differ with age. The short-
run interest elasticity of savings should be higher for younger persons than for
older ones because the human wealth effect is greater.
Finally, in the multi-period model, desired savings and wealth holdings may
well be negative in the early part of the life cycle when earnings are relatively
low. However, liquidity constraints may prevent an individual from holding
negative wealth, so that consumption cannot exceed earnings when young. Later
in the life cycle, earnings will be high enough that the individual becomes a
saver. From then on, the consumption stream follows the standard increasing
pattern. With liquidity constraints, fluctuations in income in the constrained part
of the life cycle result in one-for-one changes in consumption. Policies which
change the timing of tax liabilities across the life cycle will thus have quite
different effects when the household is liquidity-constrained. Moreover, a
decrease in the interest rate which would ordinarily cause the individual to
increase consumption early in the life cycle can no longer do so. It simply causes
the individual’s constraint to become tighter.
2. Aggregate Savings
Determining aggregate savings involves more than simply aggregating the
savings of households. One should also account for corporate savings (retained
earnings). As well, public sector savings should be included if the government
budget is not balanced.
Corporate Savings
With perfect capital markets and no capital income taxes, corporate and personal
savings would be perfect substitutes. If capital markets are characterised by
imperfect information, corporate savings may have some advantages to
shareholders. For example, internal financing may be less costly to a firm if its
managers have better information about the profitability of the firm than do
outsiders. There is a large literature on the implications of imperfect information
on the financial structure of the firm, much of which has only limited relevance
for tax issues. The structure of capital taxes (corporate and personal) typically
introduces advantages to saving within the corporation as well. Unless the
corporate tax is fully integrated with the personal tax and all corporate-sourceFiscal Studies
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income imputed to shareholders as it accrues, there will be a tax advantage from
retaining funds within the corporation rather than paying them out as dividends
(Boadway and Bruce, 1992). This is referred to as the trapped equity effect, and
can be used to explain not only the preference firms will have for retained
earnings versus outside finance but also the incentives for the take-over of
immature firms by mature ones (or their merging).
In taking account of corporate savings, the issue is whether or not households
‘see through the corporate veil’ and treat saving done on their behalf by
corporations as part of their own saving (as they should). Assuming they do, then
one should be able to think of individual saving as including retained earnings on
their shares. This means that the tax applicable on these savings should include
both personal and corporate taxes. In this paper, we ignore the complications
introduced by the corporate tax and corporate savings.
The Consequences of Public Sector Savings
To see the implications of public sector saving (or dissaving) in the
determination of aggregate savings and its changes, consider a simple economy
consisting of overlapping generations of identical individuals who leave no
bequests. At a given time, individual behaviour differs only by age: younger
cohorts will be saving and older ones dissaving. The sum of individual savings
plus government saving will equal aggregate investment; equivalently, the
capital stock will be the sum of household wealth holdings less government debt.
Most of the issues involved in aggregation can be seen by concentrating on
policies which involve income changes alone.
Revenue-neutral income changes for each household Consider first the
hypothetical case of a policy which changes the after-tax income stream of a
given cohort but keeps its present value the same. For example, each member of
the cohort might pay lower taxes (receive transfers) early in life and higher taxes
later, such that the present value of the changes is zero. The typical individual in
this cohort will save more when young to spread the income change over the life
cycle to keep the consumption stream unchanged. In the absence of any other
changes, aggregate saving and the demand for assets would increase temporarily
while that cohort was young, then fall temporarily while it was old, but remain
unchanged after that cohort had passed away. However, from the point of view
of the government, net revenue would be lower while the cohort was young and
higher when it was old. To make good the tax–transfer change without affecting
other households in the economy, the government would have to borrow money.
The amount of the public dissaving would exactly offset the increased private
saving, and total saving would remain unchanged. In effect, the increased saving
would go entirely to purchase the new debt issued by the government so that
private capital investment would remain unchanged. More generally, the same
principle would apply to a permanent tax reform which took increased taxesTaxation and Savings
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from the old and reduced them for the young. In order that the present value of
taxes of all cohorts remain the same, this would have to be accompanied by an
increase in government debt. The demand for assets by households would have
permanently increased, but so would the supply of assets from the government
by an equal amount. The economy would remain unchanged in real terms and all
households would be equally as well off.
5
Revenue neutrality at each point of time. The picture is somewhat
different if changes in government debt are ruled out. Consider a scheme in
which transfers are made permanently from young persons to old persons, and
the scheme is self-financing at each point in time. Examples of such policies
include tax reforms which move tax liabilities earlier in the life cycle, unfunded
public pensions, and in-kind transfers of public services to the elderly financed
by taxes on the young. When the scheme is first introduced, all members of the
older cohorts obtain an increase in their income and are better off. The incomes
of individuals born after the policy change will be lower when young and higher
when old; they will save less for retirement. Thus, the demand for assets will
decrease and private investment will be lower. Whether such individuals are
better or worse off depends upon the characteristics of the economy. The money
they contributed to the scheme when young would have earned a return equal to
the rate of interest r (neglecting capital income taxes). On the other hand, a
continual scheme of transfers from the young to the old will earn an implicit rate
of return equal to the rate of growth of the economy g
6. If g = r, the net present
value of the intergenerational transfer is zero so that individual welfare is
unaffected in the long run, even though the level of private capital will be lower.
The economy is said to be on the Golden Rule growth path. If g > r, the scheme
will increase not only the welfare of the current older cohort, but also that of all
future cohorts. In this case, the stock of capital is above the Golden Rule level;
the economy is said to be over-capitalised. The intergenerational transfer scheme
is Pareto-improving. And if r  >  g, the scheme will make young and future
cohorts worse off while it makes the older better off. In this case, a scheme of
intergenerational transfers from the young to the old will make the old better off
at the expense of future generations. Of course, the reverse is true as well.
The above effects of intergenerational income transfers depend upon the
assumptions of the model being used. If, instead of being selfish, individuals are
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altruistic towards future generations, at least part of the effects of
intergenerational transfers will be offset by changes in bequest behaviour. Thus,
a scheme which transfers from the younger to the older will induce the older
cohorts to increase their bequests. Changes in bequests will fully offset the
effects of the transfer if Ricardian equivalence applies (Barro, 1974). The effects
will also differ from the above model if there are capital market imperfections. If
very young workers face liquidity constraints, an increase in the tax on them will
serve to reduce their consumption rather than their saving, and the adverse effect
of the scheme on aggregate saving will be lessened (Hubbard and Judd, 1987).
Similarly, if annuity markets are imperfect or absent, an intergenerational
transfer from the young to the old will provide a sort of annuity. This will reduce
the demand for precautionary saving and will cause aggregate saving to fall by
even more than described above (Abel, 1985).
III. THE EFFECTS OF TAXES ON SAVING
The effect of taxes can be inferred readily from the above discussion. Taxes
influence saving through two main mechanisms. First, they may affect the rate of
return to saving and, second, they may affect the income stream which is
converted into a stream of consumption (and possibly bequests) through saving.
These effects can be seen by concentrating on three forms of taxation — wage
taxation, consumption taxation and capital income taxation. (Income taxation is
equivalent to capital income taxation combined with wage taxation.) For
simplicity, we assume that taxes are at proportional rates.
1. The Effect of Taxes on Individual Saving
Consider an individual who obtains an earnings stream for a given number of
working periods, and then is retired for a given number of periods. Capital
markets are perfect so the individual is able to borrow freely against future
earnings. As well, annuities are available to insure against uncertainty in the
length of life, so that we can proceed as if the age of death is fixed and known.
There are no bequests, so saving is for life-cycle smoothing purposes alone. The
consumer maximises the discounted sum of utilities of consumption in each
period subject to a budget constraint which says that the present value of lifetime
consumption expenditures equals the present value of lifetime earnings after tax.
All taxes are incorporated into the budget constraint. Consumption expenditures
include taxes on consumption; the earnings stream is net of wage taxes; and
earnings are discounted by the interest rate net of capital income taxes. In these
circumstances, the effect on saving of each of the three taxes is straightforward.
Wage taxation. A tax on wages reduces lifetime wealth and leaves the
after-tax interest rate unchanged. The time profile of consumption over the life
cycle will shift downwards though its shape will remain the same. Similarly, theTaxation and Savings
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time profile of earnings will shift downwards during working periods. Saving
will fall during the working years since less consumption during retirement
needs to be financed, and fewer assets will be demanded. The earlier in the life
cycle are earnings obtained, the greater will be the decrease in saving.
Equivalently, the later in the working part of the life cycle is a wage tax
imposed, the higher the proportion of the tax will go to reduced savings.
Consumption taxation. A consumption tax causes the consumption
stream to fall in exactly the same way as for a wage tax. It does so not by
lowering the earnings stream, but by increasing the cost of consumption.
However, because the tax liability occurs later in the life cycle, saving will not
fall as much. In fact, in the case of a lifetime utility function which is the
discounted sum of identical per-period utility functions, saving and asset
accumulation will be unchanged by a consumption tax (Beach, Boadway and
Bruce, 1988). The rise in the cost of consumption with given lifetime wealth
causes consumption to fall in the same proportion in each period. Since the
consumption tax also applies proportionately in each period, consumption
expenditures inclusive of the tax remain unchanged; so the same amount of
saving is required in order to finance them (since earnings are unchanged). The
fact that a consumption tax leaves saving unchanged makes tax substitutions
involving consumption taxes easy to analyse.
Capital income taxation. A capital income tax is equivalent to a reduction
in the after-tax interest rate. In the short run, it will have an ambiguous effect on
saving depending on the relative sizes of the substitution, income and human
wealth effects. The magnitude of the human wealth effect will be larger the later
in the remaining life cycle are earnings obtained (for example, the younger the
person is when the tax is imposed). Over the longer run, the reduction in the
after-tax interest rate causes the entire consumption profile to become flatter, so
that over the life cycle, the saving needed for life-cycle smoothing will be
reduced.
2. Tax Substitutions with Individual Revenue Neutrality
From these individual tax effects, it is straightforward to infer the effect of
substituting one tax for another. First, consider tax substitutions which raise the
same amount of revenue in present value terms from the individual. Since a
consumption tax does not affect saving, substituting a wage tax or a capital
income tax for a consumption tax will have the same effects as imposing those
taxes alone as just discussed. The wage tax substitution will cause individual
savings to fall, while the capital tax substitution will have an ambiguous effect
on savings in the short run, but will reduce the demand for assets over the life
cycle. Substituting a capital income tax for a wage tax will also have an
ambiguous effect since both are likely to reduce the demand for assets in the
long run.Fiscal Studies
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These ambiguities disappear once we take public sector savings into account.
If the present value of tax liabilities of all cohorts is to be kept constant, the time
pattern of government tax receipts will change; it will need to borrow or lend.
For example, when a wage tax is substituted for a consumption tax, the entire
amount of the fall in private savings comes about from the change in timing of
tax liabilities since the consumption stream remains unchanged. In this case, the
fall in private savings will be exactly offset by an increase in public savings as a
result of the fact that tax revenues are received earlier. Thus, total savings will
remain unchanged, along with the path of consumption and capital accumulation
for the economy as a whole and the welfare of all cohorts. In fact, when tax
changes are revenue-neutral for all households, all changes in private savings
which originate in changes in the timing of tax liabilities will be offset by
changes in public savings in the opposite direction.
Only those sources of change resulting from the relative price effect of a
change in the after-tax interest rate will cause saving to change. Thus, in the case
of the replacement of a capital income tax for a wage tax, the substitution effect
which causes saving to fall will remain. The fact that taxes are collected earlier
in the life cycle under the wage tax will be of no consequence for aggregate
saving; the increase in private saving this generates will be offset by a decrease
in public saving. Moreover, given the changes in public saving, the substitution
of a tax on capital income for a wage tax will have exactly the same aggregate
effect as the substitution of the same tax for a consumption tax. That is, saving
will fall in both cases by the substitution effect. The tax on capital income will
represent a distortion in the capital markets; all individuals will be worse off as a
result of substituting a capital income tax for either a wage tax or a consumption
tax.
3. Tax Substitutions with Aggregate Revenue Neutrality in Each Period
The above exercises require the government to collect the same amount of
revenue in present value terms from each cohort. They should be viewed as
illustrative only since it is difficult to imagine the government being able to
institute tax changes which are revenue-neutral for every cohort, even if public
saving is allowed. It is more likely to be the case that some cohorts will gain and
others lose. (Indeed, this is often the objective of tax reforms.) Suppose instead
that we consider the same three sorts of tax substitutions when the same amount
of total tax revenue is generated in each time period so total public saving
remains unchanged. Again, capital markets are assumed to be perfect and
households leave no bequests.
Suppose the economy is in steady-state equilibrium with a consumption tax
used to finance an exogenous stream of government expenditures. The
government then switches to a wage tax which generates the same stream of
revenues per period. In the period in which the tax substitution occurs, membersTaxation and Savings
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of the older cohort (the retired plus the workers part way through their working
life) obtain a windfall gain since they no longer have to pay taxes on their
consumption and escape bearing the full burden of the wage tax. Younger
workers and future generations face a wage tax rather than a consumption tax.
They will reduce their savings since their tax liabilities occur earlier in the life
cycle. Thus, the total stock of capital in the economy will fall. In the new wage-
tax steady state, individuals will be worse off if r > g, as is normally the case.
The tax substitution will be equivalent to a pure intergenerational redistribution,
with older cohorts gaining at the expense of all future cohorts. It is purely
redistributional in the sense that there is no efficiency gain; the economy simply
moves from one point to another on its intertemporal utility possibility frontier,
though the process of transition can take several periods.
Next suppose the consumption tax is replaced by a capital income tax. If
lifetime utility is the discounted sum of per-period utilities, the reduction in
consumption tax will have no effect on saving. The capital income tax will cause
the consumption profile to flatten out, so asset accumulation over the life cycle
will fall, even though saving early in the life cycle could rise or fall. Thus, the
capital stock should decline with the tax change. Long-run welfare will
unambiguously decline if r > g, both due to the distortion imposed by the capital
income tax and due to the further reduction in the capital stock. During the
transition, however, older cohorts are made better off. For them, consumption
tax liabilities will be higher later in life than capital income tax liabilities.
Finally, suppose a capital income tax is substituted for a wage tax. As with
the previous case, this one will have a relative price effect and a timing effect.
The relative price effect will be the same as for the previous case. The timing
effect will be stronger in favour of increasing saving since the wage tax is
collected earlier in the life cycle than was the case for the consumption tax.
Thus, in the long run, aggregate saving could rise or fall, and households could
become better or worse off. However, in the short run, since taxes are collected
earlier in the life cycle under the wage tax, older cohorts are made worse off
during the transition to the new long-run equilibrium.
These results rely on the assumptions we have made about individual
behaviour and capital markets. Suppose that individuals are altruistic towards
their heirs and that bequests fully reflect that, so Ricardian equivalence applies.
Any purely redistributive transfer between cohorts resulting from tax reform will
be undone by a change in bequests. In the case of substituting a wage tax for a
consumption tax, which is exactly equivalent to a lump-sum transfer from
younger to older cohorts, bequests will rise by the full amount of the transfer
with no real changes in the economy. For the other two tax substitutions, the
intergenerational transfer component will be offset by changes in bequests,
leaving only the relative price effect. Since the relative price effect amounts to
removing an inefficiency in the economy, utilities of all cohorts along the growth
path will be reduced when the capital income tax is introduced.Fiscal Studies
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If capital markets are imperfect, the effects will differ as well. For example, if
individuals are liquidity-constrained, substituting a wage tax for a consumption
tax cannot be expected to reduce saving for the youngest cohorts. Since they
cannot dissave, the additional tax liability they face must be met by a fall in
consumption rather than an increase in borrowing. Thus, the adverse effects of
the tax substitution on saving will be lessened. The same applies for the
substitution of a wage tax for the capital income tax. Similarly, if lifetimes are
uncertain and annuity markets are imperfect, the substitution of a wage tax for a
consumption tax will implicitly affect the amount of insurance implemented
through the tax system. The consumption tax system increases the need for
precautionary saving relative to the wage tax because consumption tax liabilities
are incurred as long as the household is alive. Thus, the substitution of a wage
tax will reduce saving more than it otherwise would.
4. Summary
One way to summarise this section is to review the ways in which tax policy
could be used to increase aggregate saving. These will depend upon the
appropriate model of the economy. For simplicity, consider only tax reforms that
are revenue-neutral in each period, ruling out government debt. In the absence of
bequests and liquidity constraints, saving is increased by the substitution of a
consumption tax for a wage tax or by any other tax reforms that redistribute from
older to younger generations (that is, which collect taxes later in the life cycle).
A tax reform that changes the net rate of return on saving may increase or
decrease the rate of saving depending on the relative magnitudes of the income
and substitution effects. If annuity markets are incomplete, so that unintentional
bequests exist, a tax reform that substitutes tax liabilities later in life for those
earlier will reduce the effect on saving since this will be equivalent to providing
annuities to the household (since the payment of the tax later in life is contingent
on being alive). As well, if the household is liquidity-constrained early in life,
the effect of the reform on saving will be further blunted since the household
will want to consume more of the additional income obtained early in life.
By comparison, in an economy in which Ricardian equivalence applies, pure
intergenerational transfers are completely undone by bequest changes and leave
aggregate saving unchanged. On the other hand, increases in the after-tax rate of
return on savings should unambiguously increase saving. Since the income
effects of tax reforms are offset by bequests, all that is left is the substitution
effect which is unambiguous in direction. The effects arising out of liquidity
constraints and incomplete annuity markets should also apply here. However, in
a world of Ricardian equivalence, these market imperfections are much less
likely to occur. Transfers within the family ought to be able to overcome
liquidity constraints, and family dynasties should be able to self-insure against
the uncertainties of length of life.Taxation and Savings
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SAVINGS
As we have seen, a number of different theories of consumption and saving
behaviour have been put forward. In order to deal with practical problems of
public policy, one would like to know what theory has the best ability to explain
observed behaviour; beyond this, it would be desirable to have a good predictive
model that would provide quantitative estimates of the behavioural responses of
households to different policy initiatives. Broadly speaking, empirical research
on savings can help us to test competing theories and to estimate the values of
crucial parameters; simulation analyses, discussed in the next section, can be
used to explore, in a more predictive spirit, the implications of different policies
in models of the economy that build on the tests and estimates derived from
empirical research.
Much of the empirical research on savings is not directed specifically to the
analysis of the effects of taxation; rather, it is concerned with understanding the
basic nature of household decision-making. As is clear from our previous
discussion, however, the effects of taxes can depend sensitively on the nature of
savings behaviour, so this empirical research carries important implications for
the analysis of tax policy. A detailed review of the vast empirical literature on
saving is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to review the main lines
of empirical research from the perspective of potential applications to tax
analysis.
1. Studies of Aggregate Savings Behaviour
For the purposes of tax analysis, the effect of interest rates on consumption and
savings is of particular importance, but early empirical research on aggregate
consumption functions had not found interest rates to be important explanatory
variables. Indeed, according to ‘Denison’s Law’, the proportion of national
income devoted to saving is more or less constant over long periods. If this were
true, the interest elasticity of the savings rate would be approximately zero, since
interest rates are observed to fluctuate substantially over time. Boskin (1978),
however, casts doubt on the validity of Denison’s Law, arguing that the stability
of the gross savings rate masks considerable variation in the rate of savings net
of depreciation. Boskin regresses the aggregate net savings rate on an estimate of
the real after-tax rate of return on saving and concludes that the interest elasticity
of savings is in the range of 0.2–0.4. Subsequent research has yielded mixed
results; Howrey and Hymans (1978) conclude that interest rates have little effect
on savings, while Blinder and Deaton (1985) find that nominal interest rates tend
to depress consumption but real interest rates do not, a result not readily
reconciled with theoretical models that suggest that consumers make decisions
based on real trade-offs.
Instead of estimating traditional aggregate consumption functions, a number
of studies follow Hall (1978) in attempting to estimate a model built on theFiscal Studies
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assumption that aggregate consumption is the outcome of intertemporal
optimising behaviour by a representative household. Here the objective is to
recover underlying structural parameters of the preference structure of the
representative agent which could then be used, among other things, to estimate
the interest elasticity of savings. In one such study, Mankiw, Rotemberg and
Summers (1985) conclude that the data reject the testable implications of the
underlying hypothesis of intertemporal optimising behaviour by a representative
agent. Hall (1988) finds that consumers are not very willing to substitute
between present and future consumption, implying a low interest-elasticity of
saving.
Overall, it would be fair to say that empirical analysis of aggregate
consumption data has been inconclusive in its findings about the effects of
interest rates on savings. In part, at least, the divergent findings of the literature
on aggregate consumption and savings can be traced to differences in the data
used, as different investigators choose somewhat different concepts of savings,
income and other key variables. Another perennial source of controversy
concerns the choice of variables to include in an aggregate consumption
function. In addition to tax policy per se, it has been suggested in various
contexts (Bosworth, Burtless and Sabelhaus, 1991) that aggregate savings may
be sensitive to fluctuations in stock market prices and real estate values, changes
in capital market institutions (new types of borrowing arrangements, for
example), increases in government deficits or demographic shifts (for example,
changes in age structure, increases in the number of single-parent families).
Carroll and Summers (1987) identify government borrowing and differences in
the tax treatment of capital income (especially through tax-sheltered savings
arrangements) and interest expense as probable contributors to recent
divergences in savings rates in the US and Canada. A failure to incorporate these
sorts of factors in an estimated aggregate consumption function not only harms
the overall explanatory power of a model but may also result in misleading
estimates of the effects of other variables such as interest rates and income. The
correct specification of a macro-level consumption function to incorporate
detailed institutional factors is usually far from clear, however. Undoubtedly this
helps to explain the increased interest in the use of micro-level data in
consumption analysis, as discussed further below.
As explained in earlier sections, tax policy affects not only the net rate of
return on saving but the distribution of tax burdens over time. Many empirical
studies use macro-level data to assess the impact on aggregate consumption of
effects of changes in tax timing resulting from public pension or debt policy. In
one well-known analysis of the effect of the US social security system on
aggregate consumption, Feldstein (1974) calculates (net) social security wealth,
i.e. the present value of benefits less taxes, aggregated across all age cohorts in a
given year. Aggregate social security wealth in each year then becomes an
explanatory variable in a time-series aggregate consumption regression equation.Taxation and Savings
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Feldstein estimates that social security wealth has a large positive effect on
aggregate consumption, reducing savings rates and thus depressing wealth
accumulation. (Beach, Boadway and Gibbons (1984), however, distinguish
between impact and long-run effects of social security policy and note that the
long-run effects are likely to be quantitatively much smaller than the Feldstein
impact estimates; for instance, social security is estimated to depress the stock of
wealth by only about 5 per cent instead of the 30 per cent that Feldstein
estimates.)
Exercises of this sort raise not only many aggregation and other econometric
issues, but serious measurement problems. For example, the calculation of social
security wealth requires a determination of households’ expectations of future
taxes and benefits, which are not directly observable (Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982).
A second major measurement problem concerns the effects of other policies that
redistribute income across generations, such as explicit government borrowing,
public investment in both non-human and human capital, changes in the structure
of taxation, and a host of other policies (Boadway and Wildasin, 1993). Recent
efforts to develop more comprehensive measures of intergenerational flows
through the public sector (Kotlikoff, 1992) may, however, prove useful in
overcoming some of these problems for aggregate consumption function studies.
2. Micro-Level Analysis of Savings
The tax systems of many countries provide preferential treatment for retirement
savings, for owner-occupied housing and for human capital investment. The
taxation of households and firms is often not very well integrated and the tax
treatment of gifts and bequests can be quite complex. Furthermore, different
forms of wealth accumulation have differing degrees of liquidity, ranging from
highly liquid cash-balance savings in financial institutions to rather illiquid
capital tied up in equity on owner-occupied housing. The increasing availability
of micro-data sets has encouraged researchers to attempt to take these
complexities into account in the study of savings behaviour, as described in the
following paragraphs.
Retirement Savings
Many tax systems shelter pension and other retirement savings from taxation.
Typically, contributions to pension plans, both by companies and by employees,
are tax-deductible, and the returns to these contributions (whether they take the
form of dividends, interest or capital gains) can accumulate free of tax. When
benefits are paid out to retirees, however, they are included in the taxable income
of recipients and subject to personal tax. Since the returns to pension savings are
not taxed on accrual, savings in pension programmes earn the before-tax rate of
return, and therefore enjoy significant tax preferences relative to other forms of
capital accumulation. A number of other special retirement savings vehicles inFiscal Studies
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various countries provide individual-level tax-sheltered savings opportunities;
these include Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Canada, Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and, more recently, 401(k) plans in the US, and
personal pensions in the UK.
Retirement saving is empirically very important. In the US, it accounts for
more than half of national savings, but its composition has varied widely. Over
the 1980s, pension contributions fell from being most of retirement savings to
about half of the total; of pension savings, the proportion in defined-benefit
plans fell relative to defined-contribution plans. Higher rates of return on
pension fund assets (including appreciation of equity holdings) during the 1980s,
making it easier for firms to maintain adequate funding for defined-benefit plans,
may have contributed to this relative decline of defined-benefit contributions
(Bernheim and Shoven, 1988); changes in the regulations governing defined-
benefit pensions, such as rules concerning vesting of benefits, higher premiums
to support government insurance of pension fund solvency and increased taxes
on employers who attempt to withdraw ‘excess’ pension fund contributions may
be another factor (Papke, Petersen and Poterba, 1993). IRA contributions grew to
about one-fourth of retirement savings before dropping off toward the end of the
decade; 401(k) contributions rose from a trivial amount in 1980 to about one-
third of retirement savings by the end of the 1980s (Poterba, Venti and Wise,
1993). Retirement saving has also varied in magnitude and composition in the
UK; for instance, the take-up of defined-contribution and personal pensions has
increased markedly since the 1988 Social Security Act made these available as
contracting-out options from the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) (Banks and Blundell, 1992; Dilnot, Disney, Johnson and Whitehouse,
1994).
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between retirement
savings and other forms of wealth accumulation. Poterba (1987) estimates that
an increase in corporate saving is accompanied by a reduction in household
saving of about 50–75 per cent. Households seem to ‘see through the corporate
veil’ to some degree but do not regard corporate saving as a perfect substitute for
personal saving. IRAs would not necessarily be expected a priori to have very
significant effects on aggregate savings (Gravelle, 1991), since IRA contribution
limits are relatively small. Further, IRAs might substitute for employer-provided
pension contributions, or otherwise change the form of household saving without
changing its level. However, in a series of studies based on surveys of individual
households, Venti and Wise (1992 and references therein) present evidence that
IRA participation is higher for higher-income households and that households
that make IRA contributions have not reduced their accumulation of other forms
of financial assets. They find that households covered by pension plans do not
appear to have levels of IRA contributions different from those that are not
covered. Households appear to regard IRA savings as a distinct type of asset that
is only imperfectly substitutable for other savings. Venti and Wise conclude thatTaxation and Savings
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most IRA savings represent a net increase in total household savings. Evidence
on the effect of personal pensions on savings in the UK is not yet available
(Banks and Blundell, n.d.), but participation rates are high; as more UK data
accumulate, it will be of interest to compare results with US research on IRAs. A
challenge for future work on retirement savings is to develop models that can
integrate the crucial but complex institutional details of tax-sheltered retirement
savings vehicles within an overall framework for the analysis of total household
savings.
Savings and Housing
The accumulation of housing equity over time due to mortgage repayment and
appreciation in house value increases a household’s net worth and is thus a
component of household saving, comprehensively defined. Indeed, housing
equity can be a major component of personal saving for most households, who
often retire with very little saving in the form of financial assets. The illiquidity
of housing equity could significantly affect life-cycle savings behaviour. Pre-
retirement households whose housing increases in value would presumably wish
to consume more but might find it difficult to translate appreciation in the price
of a house into liquid resources that can be used for (non-housing) consumption.
Older households usually experience large reductions in cash-flow income at
retirement and might wish to liquidate some of their housing wealth, but doing
so typically involves various transactions costs, so that their (non-housing)
consumption might be cash-constrained.
Skinner (1989) studies this issue by regressing the consumption of a sample
of home-owners on a measure of housing wealth. It appears that increases in
housing value have little effect on consumption, which Skinner interprets as
evidence of altruistically-motivated bequests to subsequent generations.
Manchester and Poterba (1989) find that households that take out second
mortgages have lower overall net worth positions, which could mean that second
mortgages permit home-owners to liquidate housing equity to finance
consumption. Alternatively, it could be that some households experience
unexpected reductions in cash flow or increases in desired consumption (for
example, due to unemployment or medical emergencies) and that these
households disproportionately seek out second mortgages. A negative correlation
between second-mortgage borrowing and household net worth could then simply
reflect the impact of a sudden need to increase consumption rather than any
independent effect of the availability of second mortgages on consumption and
savings. The link between savings and housing decisions for the elderly is
discussed further below.Fiscal Studies
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Savings Behaviour of the Elderly
Since the life-cycle savings model emphasises the importance of savings for
retirement, the behaviour of elderly households is of particular interest. If most
saving is motivated by a desire to provide for one’s old-age consumption, and if
capital and insurance markets function perfectly, then one would expect older
households to engage in substantial dissaving. In the absence of bequest motives
for saving, the ideal life-cycle consumption path is one that totally exhausts
household wealth at the time of death. Hence, the life-cycle theory would lead
one to expect a negative wealth–age relationship in old age. As explained
previously, however, this prediction must be qualified if insurance and capital
markets are imperfect; uninsured risks concerning health and the age of death
may give rise to precautionary motives for preserving wealth in old age, and to
‘unintended’ or ‘accidental’ bequests.
A substantial amount of empirical research has focused on understanding
patterns of saving and dissaving in old age and on the purchase of annuities and
insurance by the elderly. Conflicting evidence has emerged. Bernheim (1987),
for instance, finds that ‘bequeathable’ wealth, i.e. non-annuitised wealth,
including housing wealth as well as financial and other assets, tends to decrease
after retirement, as suggested by the life-cycle theory. A more comprehensive
measure of wealth that includes both private pension benefits and social security
benefits, however, seems to remain approximately constant over time. Hurd
(1992) concludes that households do generally draw down their wealth at rates
consistent with the pure life-cycle theory; he also observes that parents and non-
parents tend to dissave at approximately equal rates, casting doubt on the
importance of bequest motives for wealth accumulation. Friedman and
Warshawsky (1989) analyse retirement annuity contracts and find ‘load factors’
(mark-ups above actuarially fair prices) of 20–40 per cent. Though substantial,
these are similar to the load factors on other commonly purchased types of
insurance, suggesting that the low level of wealth annuitisation reflects a desire
to preserve wealth for bequest purposes rather than a serious market
imperfection.
Much of the wealth of the elderly takes the form of somewhat illiquid
housing equity. Venti and Wise (1990 and references therein) examine the
housing wealth of older households, comparing those who stay in their existing
dwellings with those who move. If the consumption of older households is
generally liquidity- constrained, movers would presumably choose less-costly
housing, freeing up liquid wealth with which to sustain current consumption.
Instead, it appears that aged movers acquire new housing that is just about as
costly as their previous dwellings, so that housing equity remains relatively
constant. The underlying motivation for the preservation of housing wealth is not
entirely clear, but to the extent that it occurs, it casts doubt on the hypothesis that
consumption of the elderly is liquidity-constrained. Such behaviour also suggestsTaxation and Savings
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that the relatively limited use of reverse-annuity mortgages may be attributable
more to a simple lack of demand rather than to any institutional barriers on the
supply side.
Bernheim (1991) observes that many older households purchase term life
insurance which, in terms of its effects on the household’s budget constraint, is
basically equivalent to the sale of an annuity, with the proceeds of the sale
accruing to the insurance policy beneficiaries. Such insurance increases the level
of bequests at the expense of current own consumption, suggesting that the
elderly do value planned bequests and that pure life-cycle consumption motives
cannot, by themselves, explain observed savings behaviour.
Heterogeneous Savings Behaviour and Liquidity Constraints
There is no compelling a priori reason why all households should necessarily
follow the same behavioural rules in their consumption and savings decisions.
Several authors (Diamond, 1977; Diamond and Hausman, 1984; King and Dicks-
Mireaux, 1982) use household-level data to examine the pattern of wealth-
holding by age and permanent income level. Households with low lifetime
incomes frequently save so little that they cannot sustain a level of post-
retirement consumption close to that achieved during the working lifetime,
indicating that a significant fraction of the population acts more myopically than
the life-cycle model of consumption smoothing would suggest. On the other
hand, a relatively small but important fraction of households save a great deal, as
evidenced by the fact that mean levels of wealth, by component and in total, are
frequently far higher than median levels. The behaviour of these households also
cannot easily be explained in terms of consumption smoothing over the life
cycle, but for the opposite reason: the savings of these households appear to be
based on much longer-term objectives, involving perhaps the transfer of wealth
to their children or to others.
Further evidence of the heterogeneity of household consumption behaviour, if
not of underlying savings motives, comes from studies that suggest that a
significant proportion of consumers are credit-constrained (Hall and Mishkin,
1982; Hayashi, 1985; Mariger, 1986; Zeldes, 1989b; Wilcox, 1989; Japelli,
1990). The data and empirical tests differ among these studies, but indicate
variously that consumption may be more sensitive to fluctuations in current
income than is consistent with intertemporal optimising behaviour, that younger
households with small amounts of liquid assets save less and have more
difficulty obtaining credit than other consumers, and that the behaviour of
households with significant asset holdings does conform to the restrictions
implied by intertemporal optimising whereas this is not true for households with
few assets. An international comparison by Japelli and Pagano (1989) suggests
that the proportion of income accruing to credit-constrained households may be
as low as 12 per cent in Sweden and as high as 50–60 per cent in Spain, Italy andFiscal Studies
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Greece, with estimates of about 21 per cent for the US and 40 per cent for the
UK. Evidently, liquidity constraints do not interfere with the consumption of all
households, but they are not trivial in extent either.
Intergenerational Transfers
There is considerable controversy in the literature about the magnitude of
intergenerational transfers. Data on bequests — the amount of bequests, their
disposition and the attributes of households that make them — are quite limited.
A few authors (Menchik, 1988; Tomes, 1988) have analysed court records
pertaining to individual estates, but such data are not easily obtained and often
lack important information on other household attributes Aggregate-level data on
the magnitude of bequests are generally unavailable. Furthermore, bequests are
only one form of intra-family transfers. Parental nurturing of children begins at
infancy and involves the expenditure of both parental time and pecuniary
resources at least until young adulthood. Parents may provide financial support
for their children’s higher education or for purchases of housing or durable
goods, while older children may support their parents in times of financial need
and may spend significant amounts of time caring for their parents. Few data
sources are available that measure these sorts of intergenerational transfers.
In the absence of direct observations on the magnitude of intergenerational
transfers, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) attempt to infer how important they
may be by estimating the extent of aggregate savings that might be reasonably
attributed to pure life-cycle motives. The residual — all savings other than for
life-cycle purposes — they attribute to intergenerational transfers, whether
accidental, altruistic or strategic in nature. They estimate that as much as 50–80
per cent of wealth accumulation in the US arises from intergenerational
transfers, though this estimate is sensitive to the resolution of some subtle
conceptual questions (Modigliani, 1988; Kotlikoff, 1988).
What motives underlie the intergenerational transfers that do occur? Altonji,
Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) examine the consumption response of related
households to changes in the resources of any one household. If parents and their
adult children are altruistically linked, the resources of each should be
effectively merged in an extended-family budget constraint, such that the
consumption of each household unit depends on the resources of the extended
family but not on the separate contributions of each to the family’s resources.
The evidence indicates that most households are not strongly altruistically
linked, in the sense that own resources do influence own consumption, but that
the households are still somewhat linked in the sense that own consumption does
depend on the resources of other related households. Cox (1990) and Cox and
Japelli (1990) find that parents and children are linked through inter vivos
transfers that offset liquidity constraints facing the latter. Other studiesTaxation and Savings
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(Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985) favour the strategic bequest motive.
Additional work is needed to sort out these competing hypotheses.
In summary, empirical research does indicate that tax policy can significantly
affect savings decisions; this much at least is apparent from the studies of
retirement savings through tax-sheltered accounts. There can be little doubt that
the extent of pension fund savings is attributable in significant part to the fact
that pensions are tax-sheltered, but available evidence does not strongly support
the notion that total private (personal and corporate) saving can be treated as a
meaningful aggregate. Some but not all households seem to be subject to
liquidity constraints; some but not all households may be linked through
intergenerational transfers; some but not all savings behaviour seems consistent
with a precautionary savings motive; annuities markets do exist but are not
heavily utilised, either because the annuities are too expensive or because
households wish to leave bequests; and some households appear to make very
little provision at all for retirement. The availability of new data, especially new
micro-data, has greatly facilitated empirical research, but data limitations
continue to plague researchers and to spawn conflicting interpretations. In the
face of all this uncertainty, convincing empirically-based quantitative analyses of
the effects of tax policy on savings are difficult. Simulation methods provide one
means by which the effects of policy can be assessed quantitatively, conditional
on the assumed structure of a simulation model. We turn to simulation analysis
next.
V. SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF TAX POLICY
Economic models of the savings behaviour of individual households can become
rather complex. Even simple life-cycle models with fixed labour supply and
perfect capital markets involve analysis of optimal consumer choice over as
many commodities as the number of periods in the life cycle. Adding such
plausible complications as bequests and other intergenerational transfers, human
capital formation, liquidity constraints or uncertainty about earnings or mortality
makes it very difficult to obtain much detailed insight from the theoretical
analysis of general models. Understanding the effect of taxation on individual
savings behaviour alone does not reveal the effect of taxes on relative factor
supplies, factor prices and the dynamic evolution of the economy — the effects
which are often of greatest interest in policy evaluation. To examine these
effects, it is necessary to analyse tax policies in a general equilibrium
framework. The development of tractable dynamic general equilibrium models
for tax analysis is a most challenging undertaking, however.
In the face of these complexities, researchers have come to rely increasingly
on simulation methods. Simulation analysis is now an important adjunct to
empirical research, enabling investigators to ‘test’ whether particular hypotheses
about savings behaviour are consistent with empirical regularities, to gauge theFiscal Studies
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likely empirical importance of certain types of savings behaviour or to guide
econometric analysis. Simulation models make it possible to study more
complex and realistic policy questions, and to gain more insight into the relative
practical importance of key parameters, than would otherwise be the case.
1. Precautionary Savings
As an example of the use of simulation models of savings behaviour, consider
the case of precautionary savings. Previous sections discussed the effects on
savings of imperfections in the market for annuities and of liquidity constraints.
Still a third type of market imperfection arises from the difficulties that
consumers may have in insuring themselves against the risk of uncertain
earnings. Earnings uncertainty can arise from the risk of unemployment, from
industry or occupational shocks to wages, or from individual health and other
risks. These earnings risks are not readily insurable, since such insurance creates
obvious disincentives to labour supply. Thus, households must ‘self-insure’
using precautionary savings.
A number of authors have developed models of ‘precautionary’ savings in
which households accumulate wealth as a form of insurance against earnings
risk. In general, these models are technically complex, since they involve
optimisation in a multi-period uncertainty setting. However, they can usefully be
simulated, using data on observed earnings levels and risk and with plausible
preference specifications. One use of such simulations is to determine how much
saving households might undertake because of this precautionary motive. Zeldes
(1989a) estimates that precautionary savings could account for roughly 10–20
per cent of observed savings in the US. (Guiso, Japelli and Terlizzese (1992)
estimate that earnings risk in Italy is such that the precautionary motive can only
explain a very small fraction of savings there, however.)
Simulation methods can also uncover qualitative properties of precautionary
savings models that may be difficult to establish using general theoretical
analysis. For example, models with precautionary savings generate excess
sensitivity’ of consumption to current income and low rates of wealth
decumulation on the part of the elderly, both empirical observations that have
been interpreted by some as inconsistent with standard life-cycle/permanent
income hypothesis models, and as possibly providing evidence of credit
rationing or of a bequest motive for saving. If these simulations do not constitute
formal empirical tests of the precautionary savings motive, they at least provide a
convincing conjecture for what may lie behind some of the apparent anomalies
in the empirical studies.
2. Dynamic Tax Analysis
The work of Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983) and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) illustrates well the potential policy applications of simulationTaxation and Savings
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models. These authors develop an overlapping-generations model in which each
household engages in life-cycle saving over a deterministic lifetime, choosing a
consumption stream and labour supply to maximise lifetime utility subject to a
lifetime budget constraint, taking factor prices (i.e. wage and interest rates) as
given. Given a path of factor prices over the life cycle, it is possible to calculate
the utility-maximising choices of each household. Making appropriate
assumptions about the demographic trends in the economy, one can aggregate
across households of different ages to determine aggregate consumption, savings
and labour supply conditional on factor prices; the supply of savings and the
supply of labour determine the economy’s capital/labour ratio. But the factor
prices themselves depend on this ratio through its effect on the marginal
productivity of each factor; the exact relationship depends on the production
technology. A dynamic equilibrium in this model is a path of factor prices over
time such that the factor supplies forthcoming, conditional on these prices, give
rise to that factor-price path under marginal-productivity factor pricing. Of
course, this means that factor prices and factor quantities are simultaneously
determined. Since households are assumed to be forward-looking intertemporal
optimisers, it also means that today’s factor supplies, and thus today’s factor
prices, depend on tomorrow’s factor prices. In equilibrium, the entire dynamic
path of price and quantity decisions by all households must be consistent. One
main task in a simulation analysis is to devise computational procedures that find
these equilibrium prices and quantities.
A special case of a dynamic equilibrium in this model is the steady state, in
which factor prices and factor proportions are unchanging over time. Steady
states are typically used as starting-points for policy analysis. For example, the
economy might be in a steady-state equilibrium with a proportional or
progressive income tax. The tax system drives a wedge between gross and net
factor prices, the former still being determined by marginal-productivity factor
pricing and the latter entering into household lifetime budget constraints. Since
lifetime consumption/saving and labour/leisure paths are calculated explicitly, it
is straightforward to determine the value of lifetime utility in the initial steady
state, under the initially given tax policy. Having established a bench-mark
equilibrium, one can then change the tax structure, for example by imposing a
switch from income to consumption or wage taxation.
A change in tax policy causes the equilibrium of the economy to change,
eventually leading to a new steady state. Early simulation studies (e.g. Summers,
1981) compared the steady-state equilibrium under one tax structure with that
under another. More recent work carries the analysis further by examining the
transition path from an initial steady state to a new steady state, making it
possible to trace out the effects of a change in tax policy over time. This turns
out to be quite important for policy evaluation, as becomes apparent when
analysing a switch from a comprehensive income tax to either a consumption tax
or a wage tax. Both the consumption and the wage tax eliminate the income taxFiscal Studies
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distortion of the consumption/savings decision, and both result in a significantly
higher steady-state capital/labour ratio. The initial impact on households of
different generations that results from a switch to one or the other of these taxes
is quite different, however. A switch to a consumption tax effectively captures
some of the previously accumulated wealth of those who are old at the time of
the tax change, since their wealth buys fewer consumption goods than would
have been the case under the income tax. The taxation of the stock of
accumulated wealth is lump-sum in nature (assuming that the tax reform was not
anticipated) and entails no efficiency loss. On the other hand, a switch to a tax
on earnings eases the tax burden on the elderly, who would have had to pay
some taxes on their interest income under the income tax, while the young, for
whom earnings are a more important source of income, have to pay higher taxes.
Simulation analysis not only reveals these qualitative effects of tax policy, it
allows one to quantify various effects. For instance, in Auerbach, Kotlikoff and
Skinner (1983), those who are 18 or more years into the life cycle at the time of
the policy change are harmed by a switch to a consumption tax, while all
younger households and future generations benefit. The converse is true when
switching to an earnings tax. Steady-state welfare is higher under the
consumption tax than under the income tax, but a move from an income tax to a
tax on wage income alone lowers steady-state welfare; expressed in terms of
welfare-equivalent changes in lifetime wealth, the consumption tax raises steady-
state welfare by 6 per cent, while the wage income tax reduces it by 4 per cent.
These results illustrate clearly the differences between the short- and long-run
effects of tax substitutions, and the way that these policy issues raise the issue of
intergenerational income distribution. Moreover, as is common in this literature,
these numbers are relatively large, suggesting that issues surrounding the effect
of taxation on savings can be quantitatively important.
To separate the efficiency and distributional effects of tax policy, Auerbach
et al. introduce the fiction of a lump-sum intergenerational redistribution
mechanism through which some generations can compensate others. If the
cohorts alive at the time of a switch from an income to a consumption tax are
compensated so that their welfare is unchanged, subsequent generations can still
enjoy an increase in welfare equivalent to that which would result from an
increase in lifetime wealth of 1.73 per cent. Evidently, the ‘long-run’ welfare
gains from consumption taxation are more than adequate to compensate those
who suffer during the transition. In moving from an income to an earnings tax,
there are short-run gains but long-run losses. In this case, if the welfare of those
alive at the time of the tax change is held constant, the welfare of succeeding
generations falls, in wealth-equivalent terms, by 2.33 per cent. Those who gain
from this policy do not gain enough to compensate the losers.
Simulation analysis of dynamic fiscal policy has been extended to incorporate
multiple capital assets. Gahvari (1984) considers housing as a second type of
capital good, and finds that a revenue-neutral tax reform that imposed a tax onTaxation and Savings
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housing would increase the capital intensity in the industrial sector. If the pre-tax
rate of return on industrial capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy, this
will enhance steady-state welfare. Lord (1989) analyses the revenue-neutral
substitution of consumption taxation for wage taxation in an economy with both
human and non-human capital. As before, wealth accumulation increases, but the
magnitude of the effect is dampened, and much of the increase goes to human
capital rather than physical capital.
3. Policy Analysis with Imperfect Markets
When capital markets are imperfect, the welfare analysis of taxation and savings
is likely to change substantially. However, there are few routes open to the
analyst who wishes to understand the implications of tax policy in such an
environment. Market imperfections interact with tax policy in complex ways that
make purely theoretical analysis extremely difficult. A number of studies have
shown how simulation models can offer a tractable framework for the study of
tax policy while incorporating capital market imperfections such as liquidity
constraints or incomplete annuities markets.
Abel (1985) studies the introduction of a public pension system in an
overlapping-generations model where households have uncertain lifetimes and
where private annuities markets do not exist, so that accidental bequests occur.
The introduction of a fully funded (actuarially fair) social security system
reduces risk and thus the need for private precautionary saving, which is welfare-
improving. If the capital stock is below the Golden Rule level, however, steady-
state consumption levels fall, so the effect on social welfare is ambiguous. The
transitional impact of a fully funded scheme is to benefit the first generations
(since accidental bequests are still high), but subsequent generations could be
made better or worse off.
Hubbard and Judd (1987) investigate the simultaneous impact of both
liquidity constraints and an absence of annuities markets. A funded public
pension programme in this model exacerbates liquidity constraints that limit the
consumption of the young, even though it provides valuable insurance; liquidity
constraints thus reduce any welfare gains from such a policy, or may result in
welfare losses. This problem is even greater if the scheme is unfunded; one way
around it is to make contributions age-dependent, with higher contributions later
in the working life when the liquidity constraint is not binding.
Altig and Davis (1992) have developed simulation models incorporating both
capital market imperfections and altruistically-motivated intergenerational
transfers. Altig and Davis consider various forms of liquidity constraints that
might face young households, such as a complete inability to borrow or interest
rates on loans that exceed the interest obtainable on savings, for instance because
of asymmetric tax treatment of interest income and interest expense. TheyFiscal Studies
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emphasise that young workers are likely to face rising earnings profiles and that
they would therefore wish to borrow in order to smooth consumption over time;
altruistic parents might therefore wish to make inter vivos transfers in order to
help their children overcome the losses that they suffer from capital market
imperfections. (Altruistic parents can get a larger psychic return from a given
wealth transfer to their children if they provide the transfer at a time when the
marginal utility of consumption of the children is unusually high, which is the
case when they are credit-constrained.)
These models are naturally more complex than those with perfect capital
markets and no transfers, because there are many possible equilibrium regimes:
depending on the parameters of the model, the young may or may not be
liquidity-constrained, and parents may or may not make transfers to them. Altig
and Davis examine the effects of changes in implicit tax subsidies to borrowing
and taxes on interest income for different possible equilibrium scenarios. If the
young do not receive transfers from their parents and are not liquidity-
constrained (essentially a traditional life-cycle environment), a reduction in the
implicit subsidy to borrowing from 11 per cent to zero raises the steady-state
capital/labour ratio by about 10 per cent. If instead the children are liquidity-
constrained and receive transfers, the estimated response is closer to 12–14 per
cent; if the children are not liquidity-constrained and receive transfers (a
situation close to the Barro model), the policy has no effect at all. By
comparison, a reduction in the tax rate on interest income from 22 per cent to 11
per cent raises the capital/labour ratio by 4–8 per cent, 0–1 per cent and 16–18
per cent in each of these cases. Notice that the magnitudes differ by type of
policy change within each regime, even though the policy change in each case is
a tax reform that raises the rate of return on net saving. Notice also that the
magnitudes differ by type of regime for each policy change.
As a final example of an interesting policy application of simulation analysis,
it is instructive to consider the evaluation of debt and tax policy in a model
where households face uninsurable income risk and therefore have an incentive
to engage in precautionary saving. Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) and others
analyse the effect of a reduction in an earnings tax that results in a temporary
increase in government borrowing; this tax cut is made up by subsequent
increases in taxation. In Barsky et al., the experiment is structured so that the
burden of debt repayment falls on the households which enjoyed the initial
reduction in taxes. In a certainty environment with life-cycle or dynastic savers,
such a policy change would be neutral because it would not change the lifetime
budget constraint of any household. In a world with uncertain earnings, however,
a certain tax cut now coupled with an increase in future tax rates changes the
distribution of income not only across time periods but across states of nature.
As a result, changes in the intertemporal structure of taxation are not neutral in
their impacts on consumption and savings; the marginal propensity of
households to consume out of the higher disposable income resulting from aTaxation and Savings
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current tax cut, coupled with a future tax increase, can well be much closer to the
values that characterise myopic Keynesian consumption behaviour rather than to
the value of zero predicted by the Barro model. The magnitude of the marginal
propensity to consume is calculated for tax changes that extend over one or more
periods into the future, and for varying degrees of earnings risk. For example, a
current tax cut coupled with a tax increase five periods later may generate
additional consumption equal to around 20 per cent of the tax reduction if the
level of uncertainty is in a range that corresponds approximately to the
variability found in observed earnings distributions. However, the marginal
propensity to consume approaches zero as the duration of the fiscal policy
diminishes and as the amount of risk in the economy falls.
VI. NORMATIVE ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS
OF TAXATION AND SAVING
In this section, we focus on three normative issues that have arisen in the context
of taxing saving. The first looks at what can be learned for the tax treatment of
saving from applying the theory of optimal taxation to a dynamic setting. The
second concerns the optimal rate of saving and the role of taxation in achieving
it. Finally, we look at what has been the main tax policy issue in this context —
the choice between income and consumption as a tax base.
1. Optimal Taxation in a Dynamic Setting
Optimal taxation involves the selection of a welfare-maximising tax system in
a world in which non-distorting taxes are either not feasible or do not satisfy the
desired equity properties. As such, it is an exercise in applied second-best theory.
It is now well-known that in a second-best world, where prices are distorted and
no longer reflect social marginal values, welfare analysis becomes very
complicated. We adopt the strategy of restricting ourselves to simple cases and
searching for sufficient conditions for appealing and understandable results.
Since the analysis in the literature is fairly technical, we do little more than
summarise the main results in words. In most cases, intuitive explanations are
not possible. Much of our discussion will be in terms of present and future
consumption; the consequences for saving can be inferred readily.
The bench-mark case is that of a single household in a two-period setting
with variable labour supply and no bequests. The individual chooses present and
future consumption (C1 and C2) and labour supply (L) to maximise lifetime
utility subject to a lifetime wealth constraint. Assume initially that labour is
supplied in the first period only so that all income is earned then. The
government must raise a given amount of lifetime revenue from the household,
fixed in present value terms, using taxes on C1, C2 and L. This encompasses allFiscal Studies
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of the taxes considered above, or combinations thereof.
7 Moreover, given that
there are only two relative prices in the economy, we can arbitrarily set one of
the three taxes equal to zero and rely on the other two to achieve all feasible
equal-revenue outcomes. Assuming that the tax on labour is zero, we can focus
on taxing C1 and C2 alone. (In other words, any tax on labour is equivalent to an
equal-rate tax on C1 and C2 so can be incorporated into the taxes on the latter.)
The problem is like a standard three-good optimal commodity tax problem.
According to the ‘Ramsey rule’ (Heady, 1993), optimal taxation implies that the
demands for all three goods should fall by approximately equal proportions. An
alternative characterisation of the three-good optimal tax structure asserts that
the tax rate should be higher on the good which is more complementary with (or
less substitutable for) leisure (Harberger, 1964). Thus, in the two-period context,
if C2 is more complementary with leisure than C1, it should be taxed at a higher
rate; in other words, there should be a tax on capital income, though not likely at
the same rate as the tax on labour income. If both are equally complementary
with leisure, so that a change in the price of leisure leaves the ratio C1/C2
unchanged, the tax rate should be the same for both goods. Either a proportional
tax on consumption or a wage tax would be optimal; there should be no tax on
capital income. It might be argued that these conditions are especially unlikely to
be satisfied in an intertemporal context in which the variability of leisure occurs
in period 1, while consumption is spread over two periods.
These results depend on several strong assumptions concerning household
and government behaviour and the nature of the economy. Various extensions to
the simple model have been studied in varying degrees of detail, and we
summarise the results obtained for each.
Steady-State Utility Maximisation
As a first attempt to introduce elements of a dynamic economy, suppose the
above household is put into the context of an economy of overlapping
generations, and the government is assumed to maximise per capita utility in the
steady state. The level of steady-state utility now depends not only on tax
distortions, but on how much capital households choose to accumulate relative to
the Golden Rule level. If the government is allowed to borrow or lend, variations
in the stock of debt can control the stock of capital in the economy. In this case,
taxation can be directed solely at revenue-raising and the tax structure will be
given by the standard Ramsey rule as above. On the other hand, if the
government is unable to deploy debt to achieve the desired steady-state capital
stock, its choice of tax structure will have to address two objectives —
minimising the dead-weight loss and influencing the amount of capital
                                                                                                                                   
7 A general consumption tax is a uniform tax on C1 and C2. A wage tax is a tax on L, or, equivalently by the
budget constraint, a uniform tax on C1 and C2. A capital income tax is a tax on C2. An income tax is a system
of taxes on C1 and C2 with that on C2 being higher. And C1 and C2 can be selectively taxed by excise taxes.Taxation and Savings
49
accumulated. For example, if private saving generates a level of capital such that
r > g, the tax structure should be altered so as to encourage more saving. King
(1980) shows that when the government is restricted to using taxes on wage and
capital income only, it is optimal to tax capital income more heavily. The reason
is that capital income taxes are incurred in the second period so households must
save to pay for them. However, if taxes on consumption are used as well, the
need for capital income taxes is reduced since (as discussed above) consumption
taxes generate more steady-state saving than wage taxes.
This steady-state analysis ignores transitional problems. To get to the optimal
steady state by increasing the capital stock (if that is required), the older
generations will have initially to forgo some consumption. The time path of
adjustment will then depend upon the relative weights given to the lifetime
utility of different generations. We return later to the issue of choosing the time
path of taxes to maximise an intertemporal social welfare function.
Many Goods
If there are many goods in each period, the analysis becomes quite complicated,
especially if the government is constrained to levy the same tax rate on each
good independent of the age of the household, as would be the case when taxes
are indirect. The effect of this is to introduce as many second-best pricing
constraints as their are types of goods. As is well-known from the theory of
second best, very few general results can be obtained, and none have been
obtained in this context. In the absence of these pricing constraints, the problem
would be a standard optimal tax one.
8 However, even in this case, there are
conditions under which wage (or proportional consumption) taxation would be
optimal. That will be the case if the utility function is such that increases in
income cause equal proportionate increases in the demand for all goods and
changes in the wage rate do not affect the proportion in which goods are
consumed.
9
Variable Leisure in Both Periods
Alvarez, Burbidge, Ferrall and Palmer (1992) have analysed the taxation of
labour and capital income in the two-period case where utility in each period
depends upon leisure and a consumption good. They show that, if wage rates and
the interest rate are constant over the life cycle, optimal wage tax rates decline
with age if the interest rate exceeds the utility discount factor (and vice versa).
                                                                                                                                   
8 One would expect some further results could be obtained in the case in which lifetime utility was a separable
function of the first-period consumption bundle, the second-period consumption bundle and leisure. Then per-
period consumption could be treated as a composite commodity, and one could rely on wage and capital
income taxes alone.
9 Technically, this is so if utility is homothetic in goods, and if the marginal rate of substitution between all
pairs of goods is independent of the level of leisure (i.e. goods are separable from leisure in the utility function).Fiscal Studies
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More generally, the ability to condition wage and consumption taxes on age
eliminates the need to tax interest income. On the other hand, if the wage tax (or
consumption tax) cannot be conditioned on age, interest income becomes
optimal if the interest rate exceeds the utility rate of discount; this is because an
interest income tax is like a declining wage tax, though imperfectly so.
Many Consumers per Cohort
The presence of many consumers in each cohort raises issues of redistributive
equity if the consumers have differing incomes. In standard models of optimal
income taxation, income differences arise from both different levels of ‘ability’
across households and different amounts of labour supply.
10 The government is
assumed to be able to observe incomes, but not underlying abilities, and can levy
a non-linear income tax as well as indirect taxes at different rates on different
commodities. In a static context, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that if
the consumption bundle is separable from leisure in the utility function (i.e. if
changes in the amount of leisure taken do not affect the marginal rate of
substitution among the various pairs of commodities), non-linear wage taxation
will suffice; differential commodity taxes are not needed. In the absence of
separability, the government should combine the non-linear wage tax with an
indirect tax system which imposes a higher tax rate on goods which are
complementary with leisure (Edwards, Keen and Tuomala, 1992). By extension,
in a dynamic context, if the government is able to tax present and future
consumption differentially, the latter would be taxed more heavily if it is more
complementary with leisure.
11 Stiglitz (1987) has extended the results of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) to an overlapping-generations setting in which
households consume a vector of goods in each of two periods and supply labour
only in the first. If debt policy can be used to control the level of capital stock,
and if the relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers are independent
of the capital stock, progressive wage (or lifetime expenditure) taxation is the
most efficient redistributive instrument if consumption and leisure are separable
in the utility function. However, if relative wages vary with the capital stock or if
the government cannot use debt policy, interest taxation or subsidisation
becomes a useful supplementary instrument. If it wishes to encourage saving
either to increase the capital stock towards its optimum or to induce a fall in the
relative wage of the high-ability persons, an interest subsidy is called for, and
vice versa.
                                                                                                                                   
10 See Heady (1993) for a non-technical survey of this literature.
11 One way to do this would be to combine a tax on income with one on consumption. By varying the rates on
the two, any combination of a tax on present and future consumption could be attained. It is interesting to note




If altruism is such that Ricardian equivalence applies, the representative
household can be viewed as being infinitely-lived. Chamley (1986) has
investigated the optimal tax problem in this context assuming that leisure and
consumption are variable in each period and the government must collect a given
stream of revenue through a combination of taxes on wages and capital income.
Given an initial stock of previously accumulated capital, the optimal tax plan
will be one in which the government initially imposes a relatively high tax on
capital income, but gradually replaces it by a wage tax; in the long run, only a
wage tax is used. The latter result reflects the fact that, given the additive
intertemporal utility function, the steady-state optimal tax structure involves only
a wage tax. The initial use of capital taxation occurs because at the time the tax
problem is solved, some capital has already been accumulated, so it yields a
fixed stream of income which can be taxed with no dead-weight loss. However,
the government cannot distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ capital and must tax the
return to all capital identically. As time goes by, the proportion of old to new
capital rises, so that the distorting effect of capital income taxation increases, so
the taxation of capital income has to be gradually phased out and replaced by
wage taxation.
Note that the structure of this problem gives rise to a time-inconsistency. If
the government were to redo its optimal tax problem in any future period, given
the stock of capital that had then been accumulated, it would renege on its
previous plan and impose a high capital income tax once again rather than
abiding by the previously announced lower and falling rate.
Time-Consistent Taxation
The notion of the time-inconsistency of capital income taxation in dynamic
models was eloquently stated by Fischer (1980). He considers a two-period
model in which a single household receives an endowment of wealth, saves some
of it for second-period consumption and supplies labour in the second period.
The government has to raise revenue in the second period through a combination
of labour and capital income taxation. Viewed from the beginning of the first
period, the optimal tax plan is one which uses a wage tax and, depending on the
utility function, perhaps a capital income tax. However, if the government could
re-optimise at the beginning of period 2, after the saving decision had been
taken, it would opt to get as much revenue as possible from capital income taxes
and as little as possible from wage taxes. The government’s announced optimal
tax plan is therefore not credible. A time-consistent policy outcome will be one
in which the household behaves according to an expected tax structure that is the
same as the one that is actually chosen. It will have the highest capital income
tax rate and the lowest wage tax rate consistent with government budget balance.
Household saving and welfare will be lower than in the optimal tax solution.Fiscal Studies
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Given the excessive capital income taxation resulting from the time-
inconsistency of optimal taxation, it is natural to consider whether alternative
policies might be used to mitigate its effects. One obvious policy is to provide
savings incentives ‘up front’ knowing that the income from those savings will be
taxed too heavily. An alternative is to constrain the government in its use of
policy instruments. In an extension of the Fischer model to allow for variable
labour supply in both periods, Rogers (1987) has argued that given a particular
set of household preferences, consumption taxation might be preferable to wage
taxation in a time-consistent equilibrium, even though the opposite is true in the
optimal tax equilibrium. Mitigating the consequences of time-inconsistency by
constraining the instruments available to the government seems an attractive
alternative, though it is not at all clear how such a commitment could be made
binding.
2. Is the Saving Rate Too Low?
The importance of the saving rate has been at the forefront of policy debates in
recent years, and has been responsible for many policy recommendations, such
as instituting full funding of public pensions, retiring the public debt, and
replacing the income tax with a consumption tax. Is the saving rate too low?
Feldstein (1977) argued for the US that, because r > g, it was. (Recall that r is
the rate of return on capital, while g, the rate of growth in the economy, is the
implicit return on intergenerational transfers.) He argued that, in these
circumstances, the loss to the current old from increasing saving (reducing
intergenerational transfers) is more than offset by the discounted gain to future
generations. His argument involved not only the difference between r and g, but
also capital market inefficiency and intergenerational discounting.
12 To evaluate
it, we investigate what we can infer about the optimality of the saving rate from
the fact that r # g. Three main aspects of the optimality of the saving rate can be
identified — dynamic inefficiency, capital market inefficiency and
intergenerational equity.
Dynamic Inefficiency
An economy is dynamically inefficient if it is possible to increase the welfare of
a member of at least one generation without decreasing the welfare of any person
in any generation. The circumstances in which the economy is dynamically
inefficient are quite limited. Basically, g must exceed r now or at some time in
the future and continue that way indefinitely (Starrett, 1972). Dynamic
                                                                                                                                   
12 Specifically, he derived that the present value to society of an increase in saving by £1 was given by (r –
g)(1+!)/((!– g)(1+!)), where ! is society’s discount rate between present and future consumption (reflecting
differences in the marginal utility of consumption caused by growth in consumption) and ! is the individual’s
discount rate (which is less than r because of capital income taxation).Taxation and Savings
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efficiency does not occur if r eventually becomes greater than g and stays that
way indefinitely, even though g > r now and for some time into the future. Also,
dynamic inefficiency cannot occur in an economy with altruistic bequests in
which Ricardian equivalence applies; if there were dynamic inefficiency,
bequests would adjust so as to increase dynastic utility.
Implications for saving policy cannot be derived from the dynamic
inefficiency argument since it is virtually impossible to know whether the
economy is on a dynamically inefficient growth path; that would involve seeing
into the indefinite future. For example, we cannot infer from the fact that r > g
now that the economy is dynamically efficient, since it is possible that g > r
eventually.
Capital Market Inefficiencies
Inefficiencies on capital markets can arise either from distortions, such as capital
income taxes, or from externalities. Evaluating the inefficiencies caused by
capital income taxes involves studying the optimal tax system as outlined above.
If capital income taxes are set ‘optimally’, the existence of positive taxes does
not reflect under-saving. One obvious reason why capital income taxes might be
set non-optimally in practice is that tax systems treat different types of assets
differently. Imputed income on consumer durables is typically untaxed, mainly
because of measurement problems. The same is true for capital income on
human capital investment. Saving for retirement is usually treated preferentially
as a matter of policy (for example, to encourage persons to save for their own
retirement so as to reduce the need for future state support). Moreover, different
types of capital income generated by investment in capital goods are treated
differentially by the business tax system: corporations are taxed differently from
unincorporated businesses, tangible assets from intangibles, manufacturing from
resources, etc. In these circumstances, capital is likely to be allocated
inefficiently among uses in the economy. Moreover, given the preferential
treatment given to durables and human capital, there is too little investment in
capital goods. Given the difficulty of taxing these other forms of investment, a
case can be made for encouraging physical capital investment.
Externalities can arise on the saving side or on the investment side. In the
former case, the argument is that, if saving for bequests is motivated by
intergenerational altruism, it may be like a public good in the sense that all
members of the current generation benefit from the amount that each person
saves for future generations (e.g. Sen, 1967).
13 The social return to saving will
                                                                                                                                   
13 In an ingenious argument, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) have argued that saving for bequests becomes a
public good even in a Ricardian world in which each person only cares about their own direct heirs. In this
world, people care indirectly about all their future descendants. But, by the natural process of intermarriage
among persons of different family lines, all persons become interrelated in the long run and care about each
other’s heirs.Fiscal Studies
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therefore exceed the private return, so that we might expect the rate of saving to
be too low; indeed, given the extent of the free-rider problem involved, persons
may well leave no bequests even though they are altruistic towards future
generations. The implication is that government redistribution from current to
future generations would be Pareto-improving.
The argument about investment externalities has been given prominence
recently with the advent of the ‘new growth theory’ (Romer, 1986), though it
goes back to the growth theory of the 1960s. Investment is said to embody
technical progress (for example, new knowledge, learning by doing), the returns
of which are not fully appropriated by the firms undertaking it. This implies that
social returns are higher than private returns so that investment is too low. This
constitutes an argument for intervention on the investment side of the market
rather than the saving side, at least in an open economy. For both saving and
investment externalities, there exists a difficult measurement problem of
verifying the extent to which external effects are present.
Intergenerational Equity
If the economy is dynamically efficient, if capital income taxes are set optimally
and if externalities are corrected, gains to future cohorts from higher saving can
only be attained by redistributing from current cohorts. Naturally, this involves
making a value judgement involving the comparison of utilities of different
generations. The conventional way to analyse such policies is by the use of an
intergenerational social welfare function which explicitly incorporates the trade-
off between the welfare of different generations. A convenient form to use is the
weighted utilitarian form:
(1)
where ut is the per capita lifetime utility of generation t and $ is the utility
discount rate. Two sorts of value judgements are involved in W(.). One concerns
the way in which the utility function ut varies with the lifetime consumption of
cohort t. The more rapidly the marginal utility diminishes with consumption, the
more  inequality- averse is the social welfare function and the greater the
tendency to equalise consumption across generations. The second involves the
utility discount factor which determines the weight to be given to future
generations. For $ = –%, only the welfare of the first generation matters. In the
other extreme, $ = 0 and equal weights are given to the welfare of all
generations.
Suppose that there is no technical progress, that population grows at the rate
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accumulation can be characterised as follows. If the optimal capital/labour ratio
is sufficiently low, so that r – n > $, the level of consumption per capita and the
capital/labour ratio (saving rate) should be increasing over time, and vice versa.
(Note the difference with Feldstein (1977).) The economy approaches a long-run
optimum in which r – n = $; because of the discounting of future generations’
utilities, the long-run optimum involves a smaller capital/labour ratio and a
smaller level of consumption than is true of the Golden Rule optimum. The
higher the discount rate $, the lower are the long-run optimal levels of the
capital/labour ratio and of consumption.
14 The speed of adjustment of the
economy to the long-run optimum depends upon the extent of inequality
aversion in the social welfare function. The more rapidly does the marginal
utility of consumption diminish, the more quickly is the capital stock adjusted
for a given difference between r – n and $. This analysis thus implies that the
savings rate is too low if r – n > $, and it should be increased more rapidly the
greater is the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption diminishes as
consumption rises.
3. The Consumption versus Income Tax Debate
From a tax policy point of view, a key issue concerning taxation and savings is
whether the base of the direct tax system should include capital or not. This
section addresses that issue.
There are two polar forms of personal tax bases which have been advocated
in the literature: comprehensive income and consumption, or their equivalents.
Comprehensive income (Y) is defined to include two components — current
consumption (C) plus all net accruals to wealth ()W, or real saving, S). Using the
single-period budget constraint of the household, comprehensive income can be
written:
(2) Y = C + )W = E + rW + A
where E represents labour earnings, r is the real rate of return on wealth and A
includes autonomous receipts, such as inheritances, gifts received and windfall
gains received during the period.
15
                                                                                                                                   
14 The weighting of welfare levels in different generations could reflect their population. For example, if the
intergenerational social welfare function is the population-weighted sum of total (rather than per capita)
utilities and if total utilities are discounted at the rate $
^, then per capita utilities will be discounted at $ = $
^ -
n. The economy converges to an optimum in which r = $
^.
15 There is an issue as to whether bequests and gifts given ought to be deducted from the right-hand side of the
equation. If the giving of gifts and bequests is considered an act of consumption, they should not be deducted.
Of course, the gift will then be double-counted to the extent that it gives rise to consumption by the recipient.
However, this may be reasonable in that the gift gave rise to two acts of consumption. This issue need not
concern us here since precisely the same problem arises under consumption taxation as under income taxation.Fiscal Studies
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There are some problems involved in applying a comprehensive income base.
Not all sources of consumption are included in (2), such as consumption from
household production and leisure. Moreover, there are several difficulties
encountered in measuring capital income, rW. In principle, this should include
all forms of returns to assets including interest, dividends, accrued capital gains,
capital income from unincorporated business, imputed rent on consumer
durables (especially housing) and the imputed return on assets such as
transaction balances and insurance. These should all be indexed for inflation and
should include an appropriate risk premium. Unfortunately, the measurement of
these items is difficult and impractical. Perhaps even more problematic is the
fact that, in principle, the return to human capital investment ought to be
included as capital income. Including all earnings in E is equivalent to treating
investment in human capital on a cash-flow accounting basis rather than
capitalising such expenditures, as is the case with other forms of capital
investment. Needless to say, it would be extremely difficult to correctly impute a
rate of return to human capital investment. To do so would require, for example,
that forgone earnings be capitalised rather than being deducted on a cash-flow
basis. This would require information on the depreciation of human capital.
Thus, a truly comprehensive income tax is not feasible from a purely
administrative point of view.
The alternative, a personal consumption (expenditure) tax, first advocated by
Kaldor (1955), avoids some of these problems. The consumption tax base can be
obtained from rearranging (2) to give:
(3) C = E + rW - )W + A.
Thus, consumption is simply income less saving. From this, it would appear
that all the problems of measuring income reappear in (3). However, except for
the difficulty in measuring consumption, this is not the case. It is no longer
imperative to measure capital income on an accrual basis or to index capital
income for the effect of inflation on asset values. Capital gains which accrue, but
are not spent, add both to rW and to )W so cancel out. Similarly, inflationary
losses in the value of wealth will be offset by the fact that nominal capital
income is included in the base. Thus, all accounting for tax purposes can be done
on a cash-flow basis, which is relatively easy to administer.
Furthermore, unlike with a comprehensive income tax, returns to capital
which take an imputed form, such as imputed rent on housing, need not be
measured under a consumption tax. To see this, note that the present value of rW
– )W is simply zero, so omitting both the deduction for saving and the capital
income on a given asset from the tax base will not change its present value. This
is referred to in the literature as treating assets on a tax-prepaid basis, as opposed
to that of equation (3), which is the designated asset basis (US Treasury, 1977;Taxation and Savings
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Meade, 1978). The tax- prepaid method eliminates the need to measure capital
income.
In implementing a consumption tax, some assets could be treated on a
designated basis and others on a tax-prepaid basis. Those assets whose returns
take the imputed form, such as consumer durables, are natural candidates for the
tax-prepaid method. For others, the designated method is more suitable. For
example, unincorporated business earnings are best treated on a designated, or
cash-flow, basis, because of the difficulty of differentiating capital income from
labour income within the firm, and because of the fact that pure rents would go
untaxed under the tax-prepaid method. Similarly, investment in human capital is
best treated on a cash-flow basis to avoid the problem of having to include
forgone income in the tax base. For other assets, such as financial assets, either
method would be suitable. In fact, there are advantages in allowing households
to decide which assets to treat on a tax-prepaid basis and which to designate.
Combining the two bases allows them to arrange their time stream of tax
liabilities as they choose, thereby allowing the smoothing of their tax base over
time for averaging purposes (i.e. self-averaging). At the same time, since records
must be kept of designated assets to ensure that they are taxed when run down,
there is an administrative cost involved in designating assets, which households
will want to minimise.
In practice, direct tax systems do not tend to conform to either a consumption
or a comprehensive income tax, but contain elements of both. While financial
asset income tends to be taxed (though not always uniformly), many forms of
capital income escape taxation. Housing and other consumer durables tend to be
treated as tax-prepaid assets, if not even more generously through mortgage
interest deductibility. Pension saving is treated on a cash-flow or designated
basis, as is human capital investment. It can be argued that most income tax
systems are actually closer to a consumption tax system in the sense that a larger
proportion of assets are non-taxable than are taxable.
While the administrative arguments favour consumption taxation, what of the
economic arguments? Since the difference between the two concerns the
taxability of capital income, the issue revolves around the efficiency and equity
arguments for taxing capital income.
16
Efficiency Arguments for a Consumption Tax
The choice between a consumption and an income tax concerns whether or not
to tax future consumption more heavily than current consumption. Since neither
tax applies to leisure, we are in a second-best world in which the outcome is not
easily predictable. In the simple case in which there are two periods and labour is
                                                                                                                                   
16 It should be noted that the choice between an income tax and a personal consumption tax revolves around the
base only. In principle, virtually any degree of progressivity can be attained for a given base by the choice of a
suitable rate structure.Fiscal Studies
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supplied in the first only, the optimal tax results discussed earlier for the single-
household case apply. If first- and second-period consumption are equally
substitutable for leisure, a consumption tax would be efficient. If second-period
consumption is more complementary with leisure, it should bear a higher tax. In
the latter case, this does not necessarily imply that an income tax should be used
rather than a consumption tax, that is, that capital and labour incomes be taxed at
exactly the same rates; that would require a particular degree of
complementarity. Generally, if second-period consumption is complementary
with leisure, the optimal tax would require some combination of an income and a
consumption tax to ensure that the ideal differential tax on second-period
consumption is attained. Things get more complicated once one takes account of
the fact that under income taxation it will be impossible to tax all capital income
on a par; there will be inter-asset distortions implying that capital is allocated
inefficiently among alternative uses. This presumably weakens the case for
income taxation. More generally, there has been no optimal tax model developed
to date that gives a comprehensive income tax as the preferred outcome. Thus,
the case for income taxation must be based on other considerations, such as the
ease with which labour income may be converted into capital income by
taxpayers.
Equity Arguments for a Consumption Tax
The original proponent of consumption taxation, Kaldor (1955), used essentially
an equity argument to make his case. He suggested that persons should be taxed
according to what they take out of the ‘social pot’ rather than what they
contribute to it. In utilitarian terms, the notion is that one’s well-being is
determined by consumption rather than by income. However, as with efficiency
considerations, variability of leisure complicates matters as well. Given that
neither tax base includes leisure, it is not obvious whether consumption is a
better indicator of utility than is income. One might expect by analogy with the
efficiency case that income may be a better index of utility if future consumption
is sufficiently more complementary with leisure than is current consumption.
This turns out to be the case. As we have seen earlier, in a multi-consumer world
with non-linear taxation, if the consumption bundle (including both present and
future consumption) is separable from leisure, a non-linear consumption tax will
be optimal. In the absence of separability, the analysis is more complicated and
results have yet to be derived for the multi-period setting. We have seen earlier
that with non-linear consumption taxation and linear commodity taxation, the
linear tax rate will be higher on goods which are more complementary with
leisure. One might expect that with non-linear taxation possible on future
consumption, as with a progressive income tax, if future consumption is more
complementary with leisure than current consumption is, the optimal
redistributive tax system will involve a progressive income tax, generallyTaxation and Savings
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alongside a progressive consumption tax. One complicating feature of income
taxation is that it does not satisfy horizontal equity. Persons with the same
lifetime wealth but with different time profiles of earnings will be treated
differently under an income tax. Those whose earnings occur earlier in the life
cycle will pay higher taxes.
Thus, the choice between a consumption and an income base involves many
considerations, some of which are difficult to verify. Administrative
considerations favour consumption taxation, while efficiency and equity
arguments can go either way. However, in order to justify income taxation,
complementarity of future consumption with leisure is required for both equity
and efficiency criteria to be satisfied. Even if such complementarity exists, it is
likely that income taxation alone will not be optimal. Given the imperfections of
an income base, and the administrative costs of running a joint consumption and
income tax system, it is not surprising that the US Treasury Blueprints (1977),
the Meade Report (Meade, 1978) and the Economic Council of Canada (1987)
all opted for progressive consumption tax. Of course, there are various hybrids of
consumption and income taxation that are used in practice. An interesting one is
that used in Nordic countries combining flat taxes on capital income with a
progressive labour income tax. This avoids many of the administrative
difficulties of taxing capital income on a par with labour income while at the
same time retaining some capital income taxation for distributive or revenue-
raising reasons (Sørensen, 1994).
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